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TOWARD A SYSTEM OF INVENTION 
REGISTRATION: THE LEAHY-SMITH 
AMERICA INVENTS ACT 
Jason Rantanen†* & Lee Petherbridge Ph.D.** 
Introduction 
 
The recently enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) 
represents the most significant legislative event affecting patent law and 
practice in more than half a century. In addressing the AIA, scholars and 
policymakers have focused with an almost laser-like exclusivity on the 
AIA’s imposition of a first-to-file-or-first-to-publicly-disclose system, which 
replaces an over 200-year-old first-to-invent tradition. This myopia, we sug-
gest, overlooks a part of the AIA that could hold a substantially greater 
potential to jeopardize American innovation, job creation, and economic 
competitiveness: the imposition of a mechanism for supplemental examina-
tion.  
I. A Patent Amnesty Program 
Section 12 of the AIA details a new procedure that allows patent owners 
to “request supplemental examination of a patent in the [United States Pa-
tent and Trademark] Office to consider, reconsider, or correct information 
believed to be relevant to the patent.”1 After receiving the request, the patent 
office (through the Director) must assess whether the information presented 
in the request “raises a substantial new question of patentability.”2 If it does 
not, the Director issues a certificate to that effect. If it does, a reexamination 
is ordered that proceeds along the same lines as an initial examination.3
The effect of either form of resolution of a request for supplemental ex-
amination is to effectively eliminate nearly all related claims of inequitable 
conduct; inequitable conduct being the judicially crafted doctrine that serves 
the policy purpose of protecting the integrity of the patent system. This is so 
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 1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 325 (2011) 
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257). 
 2. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257(a)). 
 3. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257(b)).  
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even when there is no reexamination of the patent. In the words of the AIA: 
“A patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of conduct relating to 
information that had not been considered, was inadequately considered, or 
was incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the information was 
considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental examination of 
the patent.”4
New § 257 is thus a patent amnesty program. It encourages patent appli-
cants to use any number of strategies that would never have been 
countenanced under pre-AIA law to obtain patents, and it offers to cure all 
but the most extreme through filing a supplemental examination request. For 
example, potential descriptions of a claimed invention in a prior art printed 
publication, or possible instances of prior patenting of the claimed invention 
by another,
  
5 that are known to a patent applicant, and that might have a high 
probability of barring a patent or limiting claim scope, may not be disclosed 
during the initial examination. Similarly, sales and public uses6 that are 
known to a patent applicant and that may have a high probability of barring 
the patentability of a claimed invention may be withheld at least until sup-
plemental examination if the applicant likes (and perhaps longer depending 
on an applicant’s risk tolerance). Even the use of false data to obtain the 
patent in the initial examination can be exonerated by filing a supplemental 
examination request, which by the statutorily required process can be ex-
pected to produce a director’s certificate within three months.7
The AIA offers two exceptions to this broad patent amnesty program. 
But the exceptions are largely within the control of the patentee, and thus 
are not likely to offer an effective counterincentive to the incentives pro-
vided by the supplemental examination process. First, the prohibition 
against finding patents unenforceable when the patentee seeks the shelter of 
supplemental examination does not apply when the allegation of inequitable 
conduct is pled with particularity in a civil action, if that pleading occurs 
before a patentee has filed a supplemental examination request concerning 
the information that forms the basis of the patent challenger’s allegation.
  
8
                                                                                                                      
 4. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1)).  
 As 
uncovering most forms of inequitable conduct requires a searching analysis 
of the candor of the applicant’s behavior during a secret ex parte process, it 
seems improbable that patent challengers will learn of relevant conduct be-
fore discovery. A similar analysis applies to the related exception that arises 
when the allegation is pled in the context of so-called “paragraph iv” notic-
es, special procedural devices that are relevant to only a small fraction of 
patents. In the overwhelming number of cases that likely means that paten-
tees are in control and can choose to immunize themselves before a patent 
challenger ever has an opportunity to learn about the conduct.  
 5. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  
 6. See id.§ 102(b).  
 7. AIA § 12 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257(a)).  
 8. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(A)). 
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A second exception involves actions commenced by the patent holder 
under § 281 of the Patent Act or actions brought under section 337(a) of the 
Tariff Act, which prohibits unfair methods of competition and other unfair 
acts in the importation of goods into the United States. This exception dif-
fers from the first exception in that, for the patent holder to immunize its 
conduct, it needs the director’s certificate and any reexamination ordered 
therein to be completed before bringing an action.9
As a catchall for the most extreme cases of misconduct, Congress also 
added a mechanism to allow for criminal prosecution. Section 257(e) states 
that if the Director of the patent office becomes aware during the supple-
mental examination or reexamination “that a material fraud on the Office 
may have been committed in connection with the patent that is the subject of 
the supplemental examination . . . the Director shall also refer the matter to 
the Attorney General for such further action as the Attorney General may 
deem appropriate.”
 Here, too, because the 
decision to commence an action ordinarily lies in the hands of the patent 
holder, the patent holder will usually have control over its exposure to 
claims that could render its patent unenforceable. 
10
While certainly intimidating, this provision is likely to be of no serious 
consequence, absent a significant policy change by the Director. The Director 




Under the AIA, therefore, a patent owner may now obtain a patent 
through the ex parte examination process despite conduct that would be ab-
horrent under traditional understandings of a patent applicant’s obligation to 
be equitable in dealing with the public. The owner may then immunize the 
conduct using supplemental examination should litigation appear on the 
horizon (or terminally disclaim or covenant not to sue at a time convenient 
to the patentee). In practical terms, the supplemental examination mechan-
ism thus provides amnesty to issued patents that were obtained inequitably.  
It additionally provides amnesty to any other patent that, if it had been ex-
 but it is rarely used. There are probably very good 
reasons why, as the extreme conduct that seems to be contemplated by the 
provision is likely to be uncommon. In addition, assuming that the main ave-
nue of criminal proceedings would be through 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which 
establishes liability for false statements in matters involving the government 
of the United States, probably few who commit material fraud need to worry. 
The statute of limitations is five years from the false statement, so—barring a 
creative interpretation of the running of the statutory period—statements 
made to effect material fraud may simply be too old by the time the patent 
gets scrutinized (if it ever does) in a supplemental examination or reexamina-
tion proceeding.  
                                                                                                                      
 9. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(B)). 
 10. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257(e)).  
 11. See United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming a conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 based on the act of attempting to conceal from the patent office the 
true inventor of the process for which a patent was sought). 
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amined in view of information relevant to the patentability of the claimed 
invention reasonably available during the initial examination, might not 
have issued at all, or if it had issued, might have issued with claims of sig-
nificantly narrower scope. Moreover, the patent amnesty program is 
administered using a patent office administrative function—supplemental 
examination. It is therefore subject to well recognized externalities that 
cause the patent office to have a more favorable view of patentability than 
courts, competitors, and the public.12
II. What’s Wrong with Patent Amnesty? 
  
In a nutshell, the problem with patent amnesty is that it jeopardizes 
American innovation, job creation, and economic competitiveness. As this 
Part explains, it does so by potentially increasing the cost of competition, 
making research and development more expensive, and making market entry 
more difficult and risky. At the same time, and somewhat perversely, it 
creates an environment in which organizing capital around a patent or mod-
estly sized patent portfolio might make less sense than it did before the AIA. 
A. Patent Law and Information 
It is dogma that the public obtains its optimum benefit from the patent 
system when the patent law is properly applied. Put slightly differently, the 
benefits and competitive costs of the patent system are believed to be most 
efficiently balanced when patents issue for inventions that satisfy the law’s 
requirements for patenting and when patents do not issue for “inventions” 
that do not satisfy the requirements.   
Implicit in this dogma is a theoretical purity that is not matched by reali-
ty. It is therefore equally dogmatic that the idea of a patent system in which 
patentability decisions are always correctly made—by either the patent of-
fice or by the courts—is a complete and utter fantasy. A primary explanation 
for this is the cost of information. It would be expensive beyond imagination 
to operate a patent system that correctly determines the patentability of all 
claims with which it is presented, and in any event, the benefits of such a 
patent system would be overwhelmed by the costs of its administration.  
Taken together, these dogmas help reveal that an important purpose of 
patent law is to improve the efficiency of information gathering, recordation, 
and application—tasks necessary for an accurate assessment of patentabili-
ty. The patent law seeks to increase efficiency in various ways, one of which 
is by allocating the cost of providing information. Typically the law seeks to 
place this cost on the party for whom the relevant information is least ex-
pensive. Further, the law requires that the party burdened with the cost 
provide only such information as it can obtain and disclose at a reasonable 
cost. Thus, for example, the law requires patent applicants to disclose a spe-
                                                                                                                      
 12. R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
2135, 2153 (2009).  
Petherbridge&Rantanen Final 11/17/2011 10:39 AM 
28 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 110 
cification of their invention that describes the invention in such a way that a 
person of skill in the art—not any person off the street—is enabled to make 
and use it. The applicant is also required to include claims defining the ex-
clusive rights sought. The applicant is not, however, required to take on the 
cost of making the words of the claim “clear and unequivocal;” instead the 
law requires only that the applicant choose words that are not “insolubly 
ambiguous.”13
Besides the kinds of information described above, the law also demands 
that patent applicants bear the reasonable costs of providing information that 
relates to issues of novelty and obviousness. The underlying philosophy is 
the same: patent applicants are more knowledgeable about their inventions, 
and how those inventions situate in the body of existing knowledge, than a 
patent examiner or subsequent reader could ever hope to be. Moreover, there 
is some information pertinent to the patentability of the claims an applicant 
seeks that may be uniquely within the control of the patent applicant. The 
cost of contributing such information to the patent creation process might be 
very low or even trivial for a patent applicant, but it may in practical terms 
be infinitely expensive for the patent office to provide during the ex parte 
process of patent prosecution.  
 
Thus where the cost of having the patent applicant provide information 
is relatively low, and particularly where the cost to the patent office of pro-
viding information is prohibitively high, the law allocates the cost of the 
information to the party seeking the exclusive rights. Two examples of this 
can be found in patent office regulations. 
In the first example, rule 1.105 authorizes the patent office to request in-
formation “reasonably necessary to properly examine or treat the matter [of 
a pending or abandoned application].”14
The second example is rule 1.56, which allocates a portion of the cost of 
providing information material to patentability (e.g., prior art patents and 
printed publications, and information about sales and public uses before the 
critical date) to the patent applicant. This allocation of cost to patent 
applicants is mitigated by at least three features of the law. First, the law has 
attempted to improve the certainty of the application of the statutory bars,
 Moreover, under this rule it is a 
complete reply to the patent office’s request for information for an applicant 
to state that the information requested is “unknown to or is not readily avail-
able to the party or parties from which it was requested.”  
15 
and has sought predictability in the determination of what is or is not a printed 
publication.16
                                                                                                                      
 13. Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2001).  
 Thus, patent applicants can more cheaply determine what needs 
to be disclosed. Second, the applicant is relieved of the cost of providing this 
sort of information if the office has already associated the relevant information 
with the patent application. Third, the applicant is additionally relieved of the 
 14. 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2011) (emphasis added).  
 15. Pfaff v. Wells, 525 U.S 55, 66 (1998).  
 16. Accord In Re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
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cost of providing this sort of information if the information is unknown to the 
applicant. Thus, for example, assuming it is unaware of the information, an 
applicant does not have to take on the cost of providing information about 
obscure theses in foreign university libraries, or third party sales, or public 
uses of the invention claimed in a patent application. Indeed, it is another 
patent law dogma that patent applicants have no duty to spend any resources 
searching for information material to patentability.17
B. A Balancing Act 
 
The prior Section explains that an important purpose of the patent laws 
is to improve the efficiency of information in the patent system. This Sec-
tion elaborates on why.  
One way of understanding the information functions of the patent laws 
is to recognize that they balance the cost of administering “correct” ex ante 
decisions about patentability, against the benefits the public is thought to 
receive from giving patents and the costs to competition that flow from 
granting patents. As noted above, patent law seeks to achieve this balance by 
being savvy about where it gets information. Normally, this means seeking 
information from the cheapest cost provider, and ordinarily that is the patent 
applicant. Historically it has also generally meant requiring the patent appli-
cant to contribute information before granting a patent. There is a very 
important reason for this.  
Conventional estimates hold that while perhaps less than 1 percent of all 
patents are ever litigated, as many as 5 to 29 percent of patents may be li-
censed. An additional fraction of patents work an economic impact, 
although they are never litigated or licensed, by deterring market entry and 
competition.18
The empirical “reality” anticipated by these estimates suggests that the 
patent office plays a crucial role in ensuring that the balance of the benefits 
and costs imposed by the patent system tip in the proper direction. This is 
because the patent office is the agency that determines whether patents 
should issue and makes this determination by attempting to properly apply 
the law of patentability. Because the economic impact of most patents will 
be due to the patent office’s decision to issue the patent, and not a court’s 
decision to uphold the patent’s claims, how “right enough” the patent office 
is in its decisionmaking is important. 
 When summed with litigated and licensed patents, this 
amounts to perhaps half of all issued patents. Accordingly, the overwhelm-
ing majority of patents that are monetized, are capable of being monetized, 
or have a “monetizing” effect (because they deter competition and improve 
the pricing position of a patentee) are not litigated patents.  
                                                                                                                      
 17. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 18. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 Stan L. Rev. 341, 362–63 & 
n.121 (2010).  
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This observation puts into sharp relief the role that patent laws play in 
improving the efficiency of information in the patent system. They have 
been built to impose reasonable costs on patent applicants early in the patent 
granting process because the legal determination most important to the eco-
nomic significance of most patents is the one the patent office makes.  
C. The Problem of Patent Amnesty 
Once we realize that for most patents that will impact the marketplace 
the only formal legal determination ever made about whether they satisfy 
the requirements for patentability is made by the patent office, we can begin 
to appreciate the jeopardy of the AIA’s patent amnesty program.  The risk is 
that the incentives of the program will reduce the quality of information 
available to the patent office when it makes its decision to issue a patent. 
The patent office will be “right enough” marginally less often than before, 
and more low-quality patents, defined as those that do not meet the require-
ments for patentability, should be expected to issue.  
When securing a patent, applicants have options. A first is to take on the 
cost of disclosing information relevant to patentability during the initial ex-
amination. The marginal consequences of the first option can be expected to 
include a longer, more costly prosecution and narrower claims allowed. A 
second option is not to take on the cost of disclosing information relevant to 
patentability in the initial examination. The marginal consequences of the 
second option can be expected to include a less expensive, shorter prosecu-
tion and broader claims allowed. One of the chief reasons for the difference 
in consequences between the two options is that applicants who choose the 
second option shift the cost of information about patentability and patent 
scope from themselves to higher cost providers like the patent office, courts, 
and competitors. 
The clearest tool of pre-AIA patent law to discourage option two beha-
vior was the inequitable conduct doctrine, which imposed a low probability 
but high cost sanction on applicants that were caught electing option two. 
The AIA has largely obviated the influence of inequitable conduct. Specifi-
cally, under the AIA, patent applicants may choose not to disclose 
information relevant to patentability of which they are aware during the ini-
tial examination, obtain a patent that perhaps should not have issued, and 
then, by disclosing the information at a later time if strategy dictates, play a 
“get out of jail free card” as Representative Waxman put it in his statement 
to Congress on June 24, 2011. To be sure, there remains the possibility of a 
criminal sanction, but as we observed above there is reason to be skeptical 
of the effectiveness of this provision.  
The AIA thus reduces the risk in electing option two, and thereby makes 
this strategy more valuable to the patent applicant. If after monetizing its 
broader claims for a time using the mechanisms by which most patents are 
monetized (licensing, deterrence of competition, and vague threats to en-
force), the patentee comes upon the competitor who prefers to take the 
matter to court, the patentee can preemptively invoke supplemental exami-
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nation. This technique offers a triple benefit. First, it allows a patentee to 
cleanse a patent applicant’s conduct undertaken during the initial examina-
tion, and in so doing remove a theory for challenging the patent—this step 
strengthens the patent by improving the probability that it will not be deter-
mined unenforceable. Second, it allows a patentee to put more challenging 
art into the file before litigation and thus benefit from patent office externali-
ties that favor the allowance of claims; and, by getting the art in the file, it 
allows the patentee to benefit from judicial norms that express a reluctance 
to invalidate claims based on art that the patent office considered in connec-
tion with the patent. Finally, no competitor will know which path a patent 
applicant chose, so the ability of a competitor to respond strategically is 
compromised. In addition, if competitors cannot distinguish option one from 
option two patents, then option one patentees are unlikely to get the benefit 
of the cost incurred by choosing option one.  
It therefore seems to us that the AIA presents a very real risk of increas-
ing the number of low-quality patents. The relationship between low-quality 
patents and competition are well established, and we see no reason to repeat 
in depth what is well known. The literature has made clear that low-quality 
patents can make competition more expensive because competitors may 
have to pay supramarginal cost prices due to patents that never should have 
issued. Similarly the literature has made clear that low-quality patents can 
increase the cost of research and development because future innovators 
may be forced to pay rents on patents that never should have issued. Final-
ly, the literature is clear that low-quality patents can make market entry 
more difficult and expensive because new entrants may (1) have to pay 
rents for patents that never should have issued, or (2) be forced to defend 
nuisance suits—to the tune of four to five million dollars for middle of the 
road cases—based on patents that never should have issued.  
And while the literature is less clear on this, it seem logical that low-
quality patents could reduce capital investment based on a patent or a small 
number of patents. This is so because in a system with supplemental exami-
nation all patents should be perceived as marginally less likely to be 
successfully enforced—because they are marginally more likely to be per-
ceived as invalid—unless and until they have gone through supplemental 
examination. Thus, the value of a patent, or a small portfolio, such as a 
small business or a start-up might own, is worth marginally less in a world 
of supplemental examination than it is in a world without. Investors should 
accordingly be willing to pay less for it.  
The same is, however, less likely to be true for firms that hold large port-
folios of patents. While their portfolios may be marginally less valuable 
when comprised mostly of patents obtained after supplemental examination 
goes into effect, as long as the portfolios remain large, there should be an 
adequate probability of enforcement of relevant patents. Thus, large firms 
should be able to get cheaper patents and should be able to enforce more of 
them. The law might thus have the effect of preferring large firms over small 
businesses and start-ups trying to enter a market.  
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this Essay is to reveal and discuss the AIA’s imposition 
of a mechanism for supplemental examination. It must be recognized that 
the analysis provided here relates to the marginal effects of a supplemental 
examination system. It is not a complete analysis of the benefits and costs of 
the AIA. Thus, policymakers might conclude that other provisions of the 
AIA (perhaps, for example, prior user rights) provide benefits that meet or 
exceed the risk of the costs illuminated in this analysis. Similarly, if they 
were to consider it, policymakers might be able to conclude that the eco-
nomic costs implicated by an increase in low-quality patents are outweighed 
by a decrease in the costs of administering patent examination. Because the 
innovation risks of the supplemental examination mechanism implicate 
some very basic patent economics, however, it is somewhat surprising that 
these concerns have not received more attention from policymakers and pa-
tent scholars. We hope that the analysis provided in this Essay can 
contribute to a more comprehensive analysis of the AIA, which will no 
doubt be forthcoming as policymakers and scholars begin to better under-
stand its implications.  
